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Case No. 20090874-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Paul R. Prawitt, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for driving under the influence, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2009); driving 
on alcohol restrictions, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6a-530 (West Supp. 2010); and driving on a revoked license and drinking alcohol in 
a vehicle, both class C misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(1) 
(West Supp. 2007) and § 41-6a-526(2) (West Supp. 2009), respectively. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err by not making a record of all bench and in-chambers 
conferences? 
Standard of Review. Whether an incomplete record entitles a defendant to a 
new trial is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See West 
Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, t 6, 993 P.2d 252. However, because 
Defendant failed to object at trial, he must establish plain error to prevail on appeal. 
See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,121,25 P.3d 985; see also State v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 
336U, *2. 
2. Did jury instruction 5 create a presumption of guilt that improperly shifted 
the burden of proof to the defense? 
Standard of Review. The propriety of a jury instruction presents a question of 
law reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court. See State v. 
Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 659 (Utah App. 1997). 
3. Is a remand necessary to obtain written findings to support the trial court's 
denial of Defendant's mid-trial motion to suppress? 
Standard of Review. This Court will assume that the lower court found facts in 
accord with its decision and affirm the decision "if from the evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to support it." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 
(Utah 1991). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In September 2007, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence 
of alcohol ["DUI"], a third degree felony after a repeat offender enhancement; being 
an alcohol restricted driver, a class B misdemeanor; driving on a suspended or 
revoked license, a class C misdemeanor; and having an open container of alcohol in 
a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor. R. 1-2. Following a preliminary hearing, the case 
was bound over for trial. R. 30-31. 
In July 2008, Defendant filed an unsuccessful pre-trial motion to suppress, 
arguing that his initial contact with police lacked probable cause and resulted in an 
illegal detention and, therefore, warranted suppression of all evidence against him. 
R. 53-60,62-70. Defendant was subsequently tried before a jury. R. 220-23. During 
the trial testimony of the arresting officer, it became clear that his written report 
differed from the dashboard videotape of the incident in that the report stated that 
the key to Defendant's SUV was discovered prior to Defendant's arrest, but the 
videotape demonstrated otherwise. R. 276:105-07. Defendant made a mid-trial 
motion to suppress, arguing that there was no probable cause to arrest him absent 
proof that he possessed the car keys. R. 276:113-14. The judge denied the motion 
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and Defendant was subsequently convicted. R. 219; R. 276:114. The judge 
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of no more than five years in the 
Utah State Prison for the third degree felony, with concurrent jail sentences of 180 
days for the class B misdemeanor and 90 days each for the two class C 
misdemeanors. R. 256-58. 
On October 19, 2009, Defendant filed a notice of appeal together with a 
motion for a stay of the prison sentence pending completion of the appeal. R. 235-
53, 254. 
He argued that jury instruction 5 improperly shifted to him the burden of proving 
his innocence of DUI, and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. R. 
238-42. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the court granted a stay as well as a 
certificate of probable cause, releasing Defendant pending completion of his appeal. 
R. 270, 277-79. Defendant was later returned to prison under these sentences 
because of multiple problems with his urine tests. R. 280-84, 289. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 2:30 a.m. on a dark, damp and cloudy July morning in 2007, Smithfield 
City Police Officer Salvador Toscano was patrolling with Officer Lance Wilkinson 
when he noticed something unusual. R. 276:82-84,86,91,123,128. Parked at a curb 
to the side of the road was an SUV with the windows rolled down and a leg hanging 
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out the driver's side window. R. 276:84-85,123-24,144-45. Concerned about the 
possibility of a medical issue, Officer Toscano pulled his patrol car behind the SUV 
without activating his overhead lights and approached the SUV on foot. R. 73; R. 
276:84-85. He found a single occupant—Defendant—laying in the fully-reclined 
driver's seat with his leg out the window and smelling of alcohol. R. 276:84-86,144. 
The officer tried to wake Defendant by knocking on the body of the car near the 
driver's door and yelling that he was with the Smithfield City Police Department. 
R. 276:85-86, 129. Getting no response from his repeated attempts, the officer 
returned to his patrol car and called dispatch for backup, stating that he was doing a 
welfare check on a possible intoxicated male sleeping in his car. R. 276:86,144. 
Officers Karren and Honeycutt responded. R. 276:86,144. Officer Toscano 
turned on his overhead lights, thereby activating the dashboard video camera, and 
returned to the driver's side of the SUV, while Officer Karren approached the 
passenger side. R. 276:86,126,134,145. They again attempted to rouse Defendant, 
who ultimately opened his eyes, looked at Officer Toscano, and slowly raised his 
hand to point at him. R. 276:86,129-30. The officer asked if Defendant was okay, 
and Defendant answered, "Yes." R. 276:86-87. Defendant got out of the SUV at the 
officer's request, leaning on the car's door jam with his left hand, and produced both 
a California and a Utah driver's license. R. 276: 87-88,131. As they spoke, the 
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officer continued to smell alcohol on Defendant and asked if he had been drinking. 
R. 276:89. Defendant admitted that he had consumed three or four beers. R. 276:89, 
148. Officer Toscano noticed that Defendant's speech was "[s]lured [and] slow[,]" 
his eyes were red, glossy and bloodshot, and he had difficulty maintaining his 
balance and leaned on the SUV for balance as he got out. R. 276:89-90,132. When 
asked where he had been, Defendant explained that he had been to a family reunion 
in Bear Lake and was on his way back home to Sandy. R. 276:105,148-49. Officer 
Toscano recognized that Defendant was "going the totally wrong way" if he was 
heading to Sandy from Bear Lake. R. 276:117. At no time did Defendant claim that 
there was anyone with him during the trip. 
The officer decided that field sobriety tests were necessary. As he had been 
trained to do, the officer prefaced the tests by asking Defendant if he had any illness 
or injury, to which Defendant responded, "No." R. 276:90-91,140. The officer then 
proceeded with the first test, the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test ["HGN"]. R. 
276:91,96-98. Defendant's performance revealed six of six possible clues suggesting 
intoxication. R. 276:97-98. The officer then had Defendant perform the nine-step 
walk-and-turn. R. 276:98. As the jury watched the dashboard videotape of the 
performance, the officer pointed out the nine intoxication clues he noted in 
Defendant's "very poor" performance, which included Defendant's lack of balance, 
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stepping off the line, using his arms to balance himself, turning improperly, 
changing the size and pace of his steps, and leaning on the SUV. R. 276:98-102,136. 
Defendant declined to do the third test—the one-leg stand test—claiming for 
the first time that he was prevented from performing the test "because of back 
surgery[.]" R. 276:102-03. 
Based on Defendant's appearance and his performance on the field sobriety 
tests, Officer Toscano determined that Defendant could not safely operate a vehicle. 
R. 276:104. He arrested Defendant and put him in his patrol car. Id. Defendant was 
upset and commented that he could not believe that he was "being arrested for 
doing the right thing." R. 276:108. In light of the circumstances, Officer Toscano 
took the statement to mean that Defendant had been driving while intoxicated, 
decided he was too drunk to continue driving, and pulled over to sleep it off, 
resulting in his arrest. Id. 
Meanwhile, from his position outside the front passenger door, Officer Karren 
smelled alcohol coming from the car and noticed keys sitting in the center console of 
the SUV between the two front seats. R. 276:145,151-52. Once Officer Toscano had 
Defendant in his patrol car, Officer Karren went to the driver's side and reached in 
over the driver's seat to get the keys. R. 276:106-07, 145-46. He put one in the 
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ignition, turned on the car to roll up a window, and then successfully tried it in the 
driver's door. R. 276:147. 
Defendant's car was impounded, and Officers Karren and Honeycutt 
inventoried its contents. R. 276:150-51. They found four beer cans in the car, all 
larger than the normal size can: one empty open can behind the driver's seat and 
another empty can and two full cold ones in a sack in the back seat. R. 276:151. 
Upon arriving at the police department, Defendant refused to take an 
intoxilyzer test to measure his breath alcohol level. R. 276:108-09,116. The officer 
read to him the written explanation of potential consequences for refusing, and 
Defendant again refused to take the test. R. 276:109-10, 116. The officer read a 
second admonition, Defendant refused a third time, and the officer read him his 
Miranda rights. R. 276:116. 
At trial, Defendant's father testified that Defendant was driving from Sandy 
to Bear Lake and got lost. R. 276:155-56. Defendant phoned his father, who 
recommended that he pull over and get some sleep and that they could meet the 
next day and together drive the rest of the way. R. 276:156. On cross-examination, 
Defendant's father explained that he did not provide this explanation of the events 
to anyone in the two years since it occurred because no one had asked him. R. 
176:161-62. In his opening and closing remarks, defense counsel explained that 
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Defendant followed his father's advice, bought "a couple of beers" before he parked 
the SUV for the night, then drank them in the parked car to relax his back and get to 
sleep. R. 276:74-75,192-93. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not making a record of all 
unrecorded bench and in-chambers conferences. He argues that the incomplete 
record prevents him from identifying possible objections made below and obtaining 
appellate review thereof. He fails to acknowledge, however, that he shares the 
burden of preserving a record for appeal. His failure to address the unrecorded 
matters when given the opportunity by the trial court, his failure to seek 
reconstruction of the record pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
and his failure to demonstrate that reconstruction would be unsatisfactory prevents 
his success on appeal. In any event, he offers no evidence of prejudice from the 
incomplete record. 
Defendant also fails to establish error in jury instruction 5. That instruction 
involves his refusal to take a test for breath alcohol levels. Defendant cannot 
establish that omission from instruction 5 of "innocent reasons" language 
constitutes error where he failed to present any evidence below of an innocent 
reason for refusing the testing. Neither can he demonstrate that the instruction 
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shifted the burden of proof by omitting a statement that the jury should give his 
refusal whatever weight it deemed appropriate. The jury instructions, taken as a 
whole, amply and correctly addressed this responsibility as well as the State's 
burden of proof. Further, jury instruction 5 does not otherwise direct the jury to 
improperly consider the evidence. In any event, any error in the instruction is 
harmless where, absent the evidence that he refused testing, the remaining evidence 
amply supports Defendant's convictions. 
Finally, Defendant seeks a remand for entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support the trial court's verbal denial of Defendant's mid-trial 
suppression motion, addressing whether the arresting officer lacked probable cause 
to believe Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The motion was 
based on the arresting officer's trial testimony that Defendant's car key was not 
discovered until after his arrest. No remand is required, however, because the 
record facts relevant to the issue are so clear that they support the trial court's 




DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
NOT RECORDING ALL BENCH CONFERENCES AND IN-
CHAMBERS DISCUSSIONS FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY ENSURE THAT THE RECORD 
WAS COMPLETE BUT FAILED TO DO SO; IN ANY EVENT, 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT SHOW HOW HE WAS PREJUDICED 
Defendant claims that he has been deprived of his right to meaningful 
appellate review because the trial court failed to make a complete record of the 
proceedings below. See Aplt. Br. at 7-10. Specifically, he points to three portions of 
the trial proceedings involving unrecorded bench or in-chambers discussions and 
contends that the failure to record these matters has deprived him of appellate 
review of any objections that may have been made during these unrecorded 
moments and thereby violated his due process rights. See id. at 8-10. First, he 
argues that despite his trial counsel's acceptance of the jury "subject to all the 
objections[,]" appellate counsel cannot identify the objections because of the 
unrecorded bench conferences and in-chambers discussions regarding jury 
selection. See id. at 8-9. Second, he contends that his trial counsel "objected to 
several [jury] instructions [,]" but that these discussions occurred off the record, 
preventing appellate review. Id. at 9. Finally, he argues that despite the existing 
record regarding the trial court's replacement of a juror following a lunch recess, 
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Defendant cannot obtain " proper appellate review" of the matter because no 
"proper recording" was made of the in-chambers discussion. Id. at 10. Defendant 
lays the blame for the unrecorded discussions solely with the trial court and asks 
this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial. See id. at 10, 20. 
Because defense counsel did not object below or otherwise request that these 
discussions be placed on the record, Defendant must establish plain error on appeal. 
See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 21,25 P.3d 985; see also State v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 
336U, *2. However, Defendant cannot establish error — plain or otherwise — where, 
despite having ample opportunity to make or recreate the necessary record, he did 
not do so. 
"Due process 'requires that there be a record adequate to review specific 
claims of error already raised.'" West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f l l , 
993 P.2d 252 (quoting State v. Russell, 917 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah App. 1996) (footnote 
omitted)). Error is not presumed "simply because a record is incomplete or 
unavailable." Id. at f 11 (citing Russell, 917 P.2d at 560 (holding "defendant [was] 
not unqualifiedly entitled to a complete record"); State v. Morello, 927 P.2d 646, 649 
(Utah App. 1996) (holding no presumption of "error simply because record is 
unavailable"). Instead, to constitute a constitutional violation, the record gap must 
prejudice Defendant. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, ^ 11. In other words, 
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Defendant must demonstrate that there exists a specific claim of error whose 
resolution on appeal requires the missing part of the record. See id/, Russell, 917 P.2d 
at 559. Further, "[w]hile the [trial] court shares responsibility to insure that an 
adequate record is made, at the same time '[t]he burden is on the parties to make 
certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve their arguments for 
review in the event of an appeal/" Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114,1116 (Utah App. 
1989) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 
525,537 (Utah App. 1998). Where an objection is made but fails to appear of record, 
a defendant may obtain appellate review of the matter by supplementing the record 
with the relevant unrecorded matters pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
11(f) & (g). See Davis, 965 P.2d at 537 (citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,478-79 
n.17 (Utah 1990)); see also City of Murray v. Robinson, 878 P.2d 1151,1152 (Utah 1994) 
("An appellant has the burden of at least initiating the steps necessary to allow an 
appellate court to rule on the appellant's claims[,]" including the alternatives 
available under rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure); Olson v. Park-Craig-
Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1359 (Utah App. 1991). Finally, when a defendant's own 
actions render the record unavailable, no remand is warranted. See Morello, 927 P.2d 
at 648-49 (defendant's lengthy delay in pursuing court action contributed to the loss 
of the record and he must bear the increased risk of record loss); see also Emig v. 
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Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043,1048-49 (Utah 1985) (requiring timely request for transcript 
or appellant assumes risk of record loss). 
In other words, "lack of an adequate record constitutes a basis for remand and 
a new hearing only where: (1) the absence or incompleteness of the record 
prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed (i.e., by 
affidavits or other documentary evidence); and, (3) the appellant timely requests the 
relevant portion of the record." Roberts, 1999 UT App 358,111 (citing Russell, 917 
P.2d at 558-59 & n.l); Morello, 927 P.2d at 648-49. 
A. No Remand is Warranted Where Defendant Failed to Preserve 
his Claims, to Recreate the Record, or to Excuse his Inaction, 
Defendant acknowledges the three requirements for obtaining a remand 
based on an inadequate or incomplete record, but addresses only the first 
requirement. See Aplt. Br. at 7-10. He contends that the incomplete record 
prejudices him by preventing appellate review of any unrecorded objections made 
during the unrecorded proceedings. See id. at 8-10. But Defendant entirely ignores 
his own responsibility for creating or recreating a record sufficient to permit 
appellate review of his claims of error. See Davis, 965 P.2d at 537; Olson, 815 P.2d at 
1359. For this reason, this Court need not review Defendant's claim. See Roberts, 
1999 UT App 358, f 11 (a prerequisite to obtaining a remand due to the lack of an 
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adequate record is proof that reconstruction of the missing record is not possible or 
is unsatisfactory); Davis, 965 P.2d at 537 ("'One who fails to make a necessary 
objection or who fails to insure that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the 
issue/") (quoting Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993)); 
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009-10 & n.7 (Utah App. 1994) (concluding that 
defendant "cannot rely on an alleged objection raised in a bench conference that was 
not preserved on the record"). 
Moreover, Defendant's inaction defeats his claim in two additional ways. 
First, it prevents him from establishing plain error because he failed to correct the 
record deficiencies when the trial court offered his counsel the benefit of the record 
below. R. 276:55-57, 95,115, 216. See Hughes, 2002 UT App 336U, *2 (Where "the 
trial judge gave counsel the opportunity to make a record, but counsel declined to 
do so[,] . . . Defendant has not established that the trial judge erred" in failing to 
make a record of all bench conferences). 
Second, his inaction prevents him from qualifying for a remand under the test 
in Roberts. This is not a case where any of the gaps arose because of unexpected 
mechanical failure or some other circumstance beyond the control of the parties. 
Instead, defense counsel failed to ensure, both during and after trial, that the record 
accurately reflected the unrecorded discussions and any objections that were made 
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therein. As a consequence, Defendant cannot establish that "the record cannot be 
satisfactorily reconstructed[,]" as is required for a remand. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 
358,1f 11. 
The first gap arose during jury selection, when several unrecorded bench and 
in-chambers discussions occurred. See Aplt. Br. at 8-9. After the jury was selected, 
the trial court expressly invited defense counsel to make a record of voir dire 
objections. R. 276:55-56. Defense counsel put a single objection on the record and 
then stated, without elaboration, that he "accepted] the jury subject to all the 
objections/'1 R. 276:56-57 (emphasis added). According to Defendant, because no 
orecord exists of these other unspecified objections, he is prejudiced and entitled to 
a remand. See Aplt. Br. at 8. However, he offers nothing more than the fact of the 
incomplete record to support his request for relief. Such a position is inadequate. 
See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f^ 11 (there is no presumption of error simply because 
a record of the proceedings is incomplete or unavailable). 
The second gap involves the unrecorded discussion of the jury instructions. 
Defendant summarily claims that his counsel objected to "several" of the jury 
1
 Although the existing record is sufficient to permit review of the merits of 
the single objection preserved by Defendant's trial counsel, Defendant does not 
argue the merits of this objection on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 9-10. 
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instructions during the in-chambers dialogue. See Aplt. Br. at 9. Nothing in the 
record supports this assertion where the record is entirely silent on this point. 
Moreover, the trial court's instructions are included in the record, and Defendant 
fails to identify any potential error his counsel could have raised below.2 
The third gap involves the trial court's replacement of a juror following the 
lunch break. That gap, however, was filled when the trial judge summarized what 
occurred on the record, permitting appellate review of his action.3 Defendant does 
not challenge the propriety of the substitution of the juror. See Aplt. Br. at 10. He 
challenges only the absence of a complete record of the in-chambers conference 
2
 In Argument II of his brief, Defendant challenges the propriety of jury 
instruction 5. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13. The unrecorded discussion of the instructions 
is not required to review this claim of error inasmuch as the record is sufficient to 
review the instruction, and the claim is without merit even assuming it was 
preserved. See Point II, infra. 
3
 The judge explained that he had been told by defense counsel that 
On the way up in the elevator, Mr. Call... [who] was one of the jurors, 
had contacted [defense counsel] and asked him some questions, which 
the Court interpreted as a negative connotation towards [defense 
counsel], or at least what [defense counsel] does. 
And so, although [defense counsel] did not make the motion, on [the 
court's] own accord, [the judge] dismissed Mr. Call from the jury, 
which would mean that Ralph Baer, No. 9, is now a full juror." 
R. 276:95. Neither counsel stated an objection to the replacement of the juror nor 
sought, in any way, to correct or supplement the judge's recitation. See id. 
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between the court and the parties. See id. Moreover, Defendant does not challenge 
the substance of the trial court's recitation, but argues, without explanation, that he 
cannot obtain appellate review without "a proper recording [of] ... all the 
discussions between the judge, the attorney and the juror/' Id. 
The record reveals no attempt by Defendant to supplement or reconstruct any 
of these gaps in the record, his brief makes no reference to rule 11, and he provides 
no explanation of why reconstruction efforts under that rule would be 
unsatisfactory. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f^ 11 (requiring that defendant 
establish that the record cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed). Defendant's silence 
on this point is noteworthy because his appellate counsel was one of his trial 
counsel.4 R. 276:2,11. Consequently, counsel should be intimately familiar with the 
unrecorded proceedings and should be able to identify unrecorded objections and 
the lower court's rulings thereon. Yet, counsel has not. This suggests that no 
meritorious objections were made during the three record gaps. 
Where there is no showing that the record cannot be satisfactorily 
reconstructed, Defendant cannot establish a basis for obtaining a remand due to an 
4
 This is presumptively the reason why Defendant's brief includes no claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 12,12 P.3d 
92 (counsel is not expected to raise his own ineffectiveness on appeal). 
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inadequate or an incomplete record. See Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f^ 11 (lack of an 
adequate record warrants a remand "only where" defendant can establish all three 
requirements in the conjunctive). But see State in re F.T., 2003 UT App 81U, <([ *1 
(distinguishing Roberts and finding that defendant was deprived of an adequate 
appeal when "a substantial (one-third) portion of the evidence at trial is missing 
from the record"). Instead, his failure to preserve on the record any objections made 
during unrecorded discussions waived appellate review of those objections, and 
Defendant is not entitled to relief. See Davis, 965 P.2d at 537-38; Olson, 815 P.2d at 
1359-60. 
B. Defendant Fails to Demonstrate That the Record Gaps 
Prejudiced Him. 
Defendant's claim of prejudice is insufficient to warrant a remand because it 
fails to identify any specific claim of error whose resolution on appeal depends on 
the content of the unrecorded discussions. See Russell, 917 P.2d at 559 (an 
incomplete record may necessitate a new trial where a defendant shows that a 
specific error is asserted and that the missing record was critical to its resolution). 
Instead, Defendant merely argues the existence of the gaps themselves and his 
inability to identify claims of error that his trial counsel could have raised during 
those gaps. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. Such a claim is inadequate to warrant relief. See 
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Roberts, 1999 UT App 358, f 11 (an incomplete record does not give rise to a 
presumption of error; defendant must show that the absence or incompleteness of 
the record is prejudicial); Russell, 917 P.2d at 559 (affirming conviction and denying 
request for new trial based on two-hour gap in record because defendant had not 
shown court that specific error occurred and that missing record was critical to 
resolution of case). Moreover, so long as reconstruction of the record remains 
possible, Defendant cannot establish that he has been prejudiced by the record gap. 
II. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 5 DID NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO DEFENDANT; ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR IS 
HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that jury instruction 5, describing the effect of a refusal to 
take a blood or chemical test to determine alcohol content, generated a presumption 
of guilt that impermissibly shifted to him the burden of proving his innocence. See 
Aplt. Br. at 10-13. He argues that the trial court's failure to include any "innocent 
reasons'' or "mitigating language" in the statute required that Defendant shoulder 
the burden of proving his innocence and dictates reversal. Id. 
Defendant contends that his counsel preserved the error in the unrecorded 
discussion of jury instructions below. See id. at 13. "Generally, when no objection to 
a jury instruction appears in the record, a defendant is required to establish plain 
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error to prevail on appeal. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 903 (Utah App. 1994), 
rev'd on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). However, even assuming an 
objection to the instruction was preserved below, Defendant's claim fails because 
there is no error in the language of the instruction. Alternatively, any error in the 
instruction is harmless under the circumstances at hand. 
A. Even if Preserved, Defendant's Claim Fails Because the 
Instruction Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof 
The challenged jury instruction provides: 
A person operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
this state is considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or under the influence of alcohol, any drug or combination 
of alcohol and any drug. 
If an officer requests such a test, a person may refuse to take the test 
and potentially suffer certain adverse legal consequences as a result of 
that refusal namely, the revocation of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle. 
R. 194 ["Instruction 5"] (attached as Addendum A). Defendant faults the instruction 
for two reasons: 1) the absence of any "innocent reasons'" language; and 2) the 
absence of an express direction that the jurors may give the evidence of his refusal 
whatever weight they decide it warrants. See Aplt. Br. at 13. The absence of such 
language, he argues, leaves a presumption of guilt that improperly shifts the burden 
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of proof to the defense. See id. In support of his claim, he points to two cases, 
neither of which demonstrates that the challenged instruction in this case is in error. 
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), the trial court instructed the jury on 
flight: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact 
which, if proven, may be considered by you in the light of all other 
proven facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The 
weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to 
determine. 
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inference of 
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission. 
Id. at 574 [''Bales instruction"]. In Bales, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the 
giving of a flight instruction was justified, that the language in the first paragraph 
was harmonious with instructions approved in other jurisdictions, and that, in light 
of the undisputed evidence of flight in that case, the first paragraph of the 
instruction was appropriate. See id. at 574-75. Significantly, the Court did not 
mandate the use of any of the language in the first paragraph, but only approved its 
use in that case. See id. 
The problem identified by the Court in Bales was the express direction in the 
second paragraph that flight constitutes an implied admission of guilt. See id. at 575-
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76. That language, the Court determined, impermissibly infringed on Bale's 
presumption of innocence and lacked any justification whatsoever. See id. at 574-76. 
Here, not only is such language absent from Instruction 5, but nothing in 
Instruction 5 even suggests that the refusal of a breath test may be viewed as 
evidence of guilt. See Add. A. Instead, Instruction 5 suggests that a refusal is 
essentially irrelevant because the "adverse legal consequence[]" of a refusal is 
license revocation. R. 194. In other words, rather than suggesting that a refusal 
generates a presumption of guilt as argued by Defendant, Instruction 5 suggests that 
a refusal lacks any bearing on guilt. As such, Instruction 5 was beneficial, not 
detrimental, to Defendant. 
In Orem City v. Longoria, the Court gave two instructions: 
Instruction No. 8 
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor 
vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination thereof. 
When an officer arrests a person for [DUI], the officer may request the 
person to submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine to determine the 
person's blood or breath alcohol level. 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to 
[Defendant's] refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by 
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the officer, just as you may weigh and consider any evidence 
presented. 
Instruction No. 9 
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request 
to perform field sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and 
give whatever weight you determine to the fact that [Defendant] 
refused to perform any field sobriety tests. 
2008 UT App 168, f 3,186 P.3d 958 ['Longoria instructions"]. Longoria faulted the 
instructions for failing to include language explaining that his refusal might stem 
from "innocent reasons." Id. The absence of that language, he argued, left the jury 
with the impression that his refusal created a presumption of guilt and thereby 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Longoria to prove otherwise. See id. at 
114. 
This Court rejected Longoria's "innocent reasons" argument because the 
record did not suggest any innocent reasons for Longoria's refusal to take field and 
chemical sobriety tests. Id. at Hf4-7 & n.l. This Court also held that the 
instruction's direction that the jury apportion weight as they deemed fit did not 
"adversely affect[] Defendant's presumption of innocence" or otherwise shift the 
burden of proof to the defense. Id. at % 5. While this Court approved of the 
language instructing the jury to give whatever weight to the refusal evidence they 
chose, it did not mandate the use of that language. See id. 
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As in Longoria, Defendant here points to no record evidence suggesting a need 
for "innocent reasons" language in Instruction 5. Indeed, there is none. Officer 
Toscano mentioned Defendant's refusal of a breath test at the police station, but was 
not asked by either counsel to elaborate on Defendant's reasoning behind the 
refusal. R. 276:109-10, 116. Further, the record does not reflect that Defendant 
requested "innocent reasons" language or submitted a proposed instruction 
containing such language. And on appeal, Defendant fails to articulate any innocent 
reason for his refusal of the breath test. Absent a basis for including such language, 
its absence does not amount to error. See Longoria, 2008 UT App 168, \ 6 (refusing 
to include "innocent reasons" language in DUI instruction not error where it was 
not warranted by the evidence). 
Further, although both Bales and Longoria involved approval of instructions 
that expressly directed jurors to apportion whatever weight they chose to evidence 
of refusal, neither case required this language in order to save the instruction from 
infirmity. Moreover, in this case, there was no need for such an express statement in 
Instruction 5 where the jury was otherwise amply informed of both their role in 
evaluating the evidence and the State's burden of proof. R. 188-89,197,198,199, 
204, 205, 208-09, 211 (introduction and Instructions 8-10,15-16,19-20, 22). See also 
State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, \ 14,136 P.3d 1261 ("[I]f, taken as a whole, [the 
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jury instructions] fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, the fact 
that one of the instructions, standing alone, is not as accurate as it might have been 
is not reversible error.") (first alteration in original); State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, 
]f 31, 64 P.3d 1218 ("[J]ury instructions must be evaluated as a whole to determine 
their adequacy/7) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, nothing in the language of Instruction 5 directed the jury to interpret 
Defendant's refusal as evidence of his guilt. The first paragraph of Instruction 5 
echoes the first paragraph of the first Longoria instruction and correctly informs the 
jury that under Utah law, operating a motor vehicle amounts to consent to testing 
for blood or breath alcohol content. Compare Longoria, 2008 UT App 168,13 with R. 
194. The second paragraph of Instruction 5 correctly states that an officer may 
request and a person may refuse such a test, as did the Longoria instructions. Id. 
Instruction 5 ends with a statement of fact not included in the Longoria 
instructions: that refusal of a test has "potential]] ... adverse legal consequences ... 
namely, the revocation of the person's [driver's] license[.]" R. 194. This language 
does not direct the jury to presume guilt from Defendant's refusal to take the test. 
Nor does it suggest that Defendant's refusal must have an adverse impact on the 
instant criminal proceedings. Rather, it merely identifies a legal consequence that 
exists independent of this criminal matter without suggesting that the refusal 
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should be considered in the instant matter. Accordingly, the instruction does not 
shift the burden of proof to the defense, and Defendant's claim fails, even assuming 
it had been preserved below. 
B. In Any Event, Any Error is Harmless 
Even assuming that Instruction 5 constitutes error, reversal is not warranted 
because any error is harmless. The error would not affect Defendant's substantial 
rights because, absent evidence of his refusal to submit to the breath test, the 
remaining evidence provided an ample basis for his conviction. See Bales, 675 P.2d 
at 576 (error in expressly instructing jury that flight constitutes an implied 
admission of guilt was harmless in light of existence of other evidence providing an 
ample basis for conviction); Utah R. Cr. P. 30(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded."). The officer testified that Defendant admitted having had three or 
four beers. R. 276:89, 148. The jury saw the videotape of Defendant's nine-step 
walk-and-turn test that demonstrated his significant difficulty in maintaining his 
balance, including his stumbling throughout the test. See R. 276:100-03; State's Exh. 
002. Officer Toscano explained that he found nine clues suggesting intoxication in 
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that test, and six out of six indications of intoxication on the HGN test.5 R. 276:97-
102, 136. The officer described Defendant's bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, 
Defendant's need to lean on or touch the car to maintain his balance, and the strong 
odor of alcohol that emanated from Defendant R. 276:85-90,131-32. The officer 
also noted that despite Defendant's intent to travel between Bear Lake and Sandy, 
Defendant had parked his car in Smithfield, which meant that "[h]e was going the 
totally wrong way[.]" R. 276:105, 117, 148-49. Finally, the officer repeated 
Defendant's statement that he could not believe he was being arrested for "doing 
the right thingf,]" which the officer interpreted as an admission that Defendant 
realized he was too intoxicated to continue driving and pulled over to sleep it off. 
R. 276:108. With this evidence, the jury is not reasonably likely to have rendered a 
more favorable verdict for Defendant absent Instruction 5 and the related evidence 
of refusal. See Bales, 675 P.2d at 576. 
III. 
OFFICER TOSCANO HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO DISCOVERY OF THE CAR KEY 
Finally, Defendant challenges the existence of probable cause for his arrest. 
See Aplt. Br. at 14. Specifically, he believes that because the key to his SUV was not 
5
 Defendant does not challenge on appeal the procedures followed for 
conducting the field sobriety tests. 
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discovered until after his arrest, Officer Toscano lacked probable cause to believe 
that a crime had been committed. See id. at 14-18. However, he makes no 
substantive argument to support this claim. Instead, he argues that a remand is 
necessary because the trial court's denial of his mid-trial suppression motion raising 
this issue was not supported by any findings of fact or conclusions of law. See id. at 
18-19. 
Generally, "when factual issues are involved in deciding a motion to 
suppress, trial courts are required to make detailed findings sufficient to enable 
appellate courts to adequately review the trial court's decision." See City ofOrem v. 
Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1388 n.7 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 
880, 882 (Utah App. 1990)). However, failure to make factual findings does not 
always warrant reversal. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 (Utah 1991). 
"[T]his court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings/' Id. at 788 n.6 (citing Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 226 
(1952)); see also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1997) (citations and 
quotations omitted) ("[W]hen factual issues are presented to and must be resolved 
by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we assume that the 
trier of [the] facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision 
29 
if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it... If the 
ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable,... we will remand[.]"); 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990) (no remand required where 
relevant facts were undisputed and record provided for meaningful review). 
In this case, the record facts clearly support the trial court's denial of the 
suppression motion where, under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Toscano 
had sufficient probable cause to arrest Defendant regardless of when—or if—the 
key was located. 
"[T]o justify a warrantless arrest 'an officer must have probable cause ... to 
believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense."7 State v. 
Despain, 2007 UT App 367, If 9,173 P.3d 213 (quoting State v. Hechtle, 2007 UT App 
96, Tj 10, 89 P.3d 185) (omission in original) (additional quotation omitted). 
'"Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense 
has been or is being committed.'" State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, | 34,164 P.3d 397 
(quoting State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (citation, internal 
quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). "The validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, 
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cautious police officer ... guided by his experience and training/" State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986) (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Davis, 
458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Or. 1972)). Moreover, the relevant facts are viewed under 
the totality of the circumstances. See Despain, 2007 UT App 367, <f 9. 
Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. 
R.276:104. A person is guilty of driving under the influence if the person "operate[s] 
or [is] in actual physical control of a vehicle ... [and] the person ... is under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to 
a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle[.]" Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6a-502(l)(b) (West Supp. 2009). Defendant's suppression motion 
centered on the officer's knowledge of the existence and location of the SUV key, 
arguing that without knowing where the key was before he arrested Defendant, the 
officer could not have had probable cause for the arrest. R. 276:113-14; Aplt. Br. at 
14-17. The location of the key is irrelevant to the officer's belief that Defendant was 
impaired. Consequently, Defendant's claim necessarily relates to the officer's belief 
that Defendant was "operating] or ... in actual physical control of the vehicle[.]" 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502(l). 
An assessment of whether an accused is in actual physical control of a vehicle 
requires a review of the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 
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473, 477-78 (Utah App. 1993); Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 (Utah App. 
1990). Relevant, but non-exclusive, factors include: 
(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; 
(2) the position of the automobile; 
(3) whether the automobile's motor was running; 
(4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; 
(5) whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; 
(6) whether defendant had possession of the ignition key; 
(7) defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; 
(8) how the car got to where it was found; and 
(9) whether defendant drove it there. 
Barnhart, 850 P.2d at 477-78 (quoting Walker, 790 P.2d at 93). None of the factors, 
however, is "dispositive of the question of [actual physical control of a vehicle] as a 
matter of law[.]" Id. at 477-78 (citing Walker, 790 P.2d at 93). 
Defendant's possession of the ignition key is but a single nondispositive factor 
in the probable cause assessment. See id.; see also Walker, 790 P.2d at 92-93 
("'evidence that the key was in the ignition ... is merely a fact—along with the 
defendant's presence asleep and intoxicated in the vehicle — which, being capable of 
establishing the defendant's actual physical control of the vehicle, precludes the 
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conclusion that as a matter of law the defendant was not in actual physical control of 
the vehicle . . /") (quoting with approval Fieselman v. State, 537 So.2d 603, 606-07 
(Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1988)) (italics in original). The record as to several of the 
remaining factors is clear, uncontroverted, and supports both the arrest and the trial 
court's rejection of Defendant's suppression motion, even absent the location of the 
key.6 The officer discovered Defendant alone and asleep in the driver's seat of the 
SUV at 2:30 in the morning. R. 276:83-86,124,144-45. The windows were down, 
and the car was parked at the curb on a city street in Smithfield, permitting it to be 
driven away at the whim of its driver. R. 276:83-86,144-45. Not only was there no 
sign of anyone else with Defendant, but Defendant admitted that he drove the 
vehicle to its present location and was not yet to his destination. R. 276:105,148-49. 
That Defendant had been driving was also established through his father, who 
testified that Defendant had called him enroute to say that he was lost. R. 276:156. 
Moreover, the officer recognized that Smithf ield was not on the route between Bear 
Lake and Sandy, reasonably suggesting, with the evidence of Defendant's 
intoxication, that he had been too inebriated to properly negotiate as he drove. R. 
276:105,117,148-49. 
6
 Ample evidence supported the officer's belief that Defendant was 
intoxicated, which evidence Defendant does not challenge. See Point IIB, supra. 
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Viewed in combination, these facts establish probable cause to believe that 
Defendant had already committed DUI by driving to Smithfield from Bear Lake 
while intoxicated. They also establish that Defendant, as sole occupant and driver 
of the car in the middle of a solo road trip, either had the key in his possession or 
knew where it was and had access to it whenever he cared to resume the trip. 
Defendant's contention at trial that he was not intoxicated when he drove to 
Smithfield does not prevent a finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest 
when he found Defendant intoxicated and alone in the car. See Despain, 2007 UT 
App 367, If 9; State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, f 7,141 P.3d 602 (probable cause 
"'does not demand any showing that [the officer's] belief be correct or more likely 
true than false.'") (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742,103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)); 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah App. 1995) ("[P]robable cause is only the 
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.") (quoting State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284,285 (Utah App. 1990) (internal quotation marks and additional 
citations omitted)). 
Because the facts surrounding Defendant's physical control of the SUV are in 
accord with a finding of probable cause to arrest, this Court should deny 
Defendant's request for a remand to obtain findings, and should affirm the trial 
court's rejection of Defendant's claim. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted September f , 2010. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
A person operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for 
the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug. 
If an officer requests such a test, a person may refuse to take the test and potentially suffer 
certain adverse legal consequences as a result of that refusal namely, the revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
